

the all-too-brief argument are (a) Nietzsche's insistence that cruelty (or 'spiritualized' cruelty) is, in fact, a major condition for high cultural achievement, and (b) an account of justice in which the rights of the few (higher individuals) take precedence over the rights of the many (and a society in which there is no systematic safety net against cruelty). Or again, the supreme value he places on individual life-enhancement and self-legislation is held to leave room for, or even to justify, unfettered brutality. One of the surprising things about May's version of this not unfamiliar thesis is that it appears almost as an afterthought and without consideration of its enormous implications for Nietzsche's ethics as a whole (if it were true). In seeking to make the case, he notes some relevant passages and makes some summary remarks about the social and political aspects of Nietzsche's ethics. What he says makes a start on the topic, but there is a huge gap at this point between the argument and what it is supposed to show.

In the supplementary case study in part II, May begins by making a good case for focusing on the value of truth. He also makes a good case for thinking that Nietzsche's perspectivism allows for a subject-independent view of reality (chapter 7). This leads to his main concern, to expound and assess Nietzsche's critique of truth as an unconditional value and to consider how the valuation of truth fits within his philosophy (chapters 8, 9, and 10).

Nietzsche treats the commitment to valuing truth unconditionally—as found in Christianity, Platonist metaphysics, and modern science—as a moral stance (the desire not to deceive others or oneself). While he himself stresses the need for intellectual conscience and rigorous honesty, he thinks that the unconditional valuing of truth is wrong because it denies the nature of human life (as temporal and conditioned) and fails to recognise the value of certain forms of untruth in human life. In its extremism, it opens the way to nihilism and the impoverishment of life. In short, it is life-denying. In response, May appears to take the general point of the critique, but challenges Nietzsche's view that commitment to science must be a moral faith and could not be based, for example, on 'a calculus of utility'. His counter-argument is that we can be justified in valuing truth passionately because it leads to control over nature (as Bacon held) or, again, because of the fundamental importance of truth-telling in communicative practice. What is more, the Judaeo-Christian tradition can affirm the value of truth on similar grounds without having to rely on the life-denying character of the ascetic ideal. By this point the Nietzschean critique appears to be reduced to the idea that we need untruth as well as truth. Finding the balance is difficult, but who could deny that, for a flourishing life, we need poetry as well as philosophy, art as well as truth?

How then is truth valued in Nietzsche's new ethics? Its great value, May suggests, is vested in its role in overcoming the life-denying 'errors' of the old morality at this stage of European history. More generally, truth is valued because it measures the degree to which we are able to face reality (higher types risk more truth and can take more truth). Truth calls for courage and reverence for the self. It grounds hope and sets us free to assume responsibility for becoming what we are. In a word, truth matters for Nietzsche because it serves life-enhancement, especially in relation to form-creation in philosophy, art, and the development of character. May's informative discussion of these issues should help to dispel many of the misconceptions that surround Nietzsche's views on the nature and value of truth.

Having gone so far with Nietzsche's 'courageous . . . evaluation of the value of truth', May ends by challenging once again the fundamental assumption that the affirmation of a transcendent world, as in Christianity or Platonism, is necessarily life-denying anyway. His view is that Nietzsche begs the question in thinking that life-enhancement necessarily requires world-affirmation in his terms. What then is the significance of Nietzsche's ethics on this account? The concluding thought seems to be that perhaps Nietzsche's ethics presents a serious challenge to us, but then perhaps it does not. If so, one is made to think that here is a philosophy, with its mixture of gold nuggets and base metals, that leaves everything as it is. Could this be Nietzsche's fate?

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Levine, Joseph, *Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 204, £22.50 (cloth).

The aim of this book is to defend the 'explanatory gap', Levine's own influential notion in the philosophical studies of phenomenal consciousness. The entire book proves how clear and systematic are Levine's arguments in dealing with even as highly intractable an issue as the mystery of consciousness.

The mind-body problem in its contemporary guise is rooted in two *prima facie* plausible but incompatible propositions:

1. Some form of materialism or physicalism is true.
2. Phenomenal consciousness, raw feel, or qualia cannot be explained physicalistically.

The traditional strategy for solving the problem is simply to reject one or the other of these propositions. Thus some philosophers reject (1) and become dualists accordingly, and others reject (2) and become materialists accordingly. Levine, however, ventures to accept both propositions. While he defends materialism he also believes that we can never make *a priori* derivations from physical facts to phenomenal facts.

Chapter 1 of the book is devoted to establishing (1). In order to define his materialism Levine reflects on the nested dilemmas that materialism in general confronts. The dilemmas go as follows: the definition of 'physical' has either an *a priori* or an *a posteriori* source. The former cannot be true because if that is the case then physical science will be excluded from materialism. If the latter is the case, however, it falls into 'Hempel's dilemma', according to which materialism is either trivial or false. Hempel famously claimed that if the physical was defined by relying on contemporary physics then materialism would clearly be false. The reason is simply that, as anyone agrees, current physics is still incomplete. On the other hand if the physical were defined by appealing to future physics, Hempel continued, then materialism would be a trivial philosophical position based on what we have not yet seen. Levine resolves these dilemmas by arguing that we do not need a clear conception of the physical, because what we need in fact is 'a clear, or even not-so-clear, conception of the mental' (20). Thus he accepts a form of materialism which is embodied in the thesis *M'* as follows:

M': Only non-mental properties are instantiated in a basic way; all mental properties are instantiated by being realised by the instantiation of other, non-mental properties (21).

Suppose that qualitative property *Q* is realised by the instantiation of physical property *P* in this world. Then if *M'* were true it would appear that there is not a possible world in which *P* is instantiated but *Q* is not. According to the 'conceivability argument', however, there is such a world. The argument asserts that a zombie, a molecular duplicate of a conscious human being who lacks phenomenal experiences, is conceivable (or conceptually possible, in Levine's terminology). If a zombie is conceivable then it is metaphysically possible for it to exist because arguably the conceivability of one thing entails its metaphysical possibility. If the existence of a zombie is metaphysically possible then it follows that the connection between *P* and *Q* is only a nomological necessity. Therefore, it is concluded that the materialism imbedded in *M'* is false. Levine spends the whole of chapter 2 in defending his materialism from this argument. While some materialists do not accept the conceivability of a zombie in the first place Levine is ready to grant it. He denies, however, the entailment from the conceivability of a zombie to its metaphysical possibility. As a 'non-exceptionalist', Levine does two things. First, he rejects a general semantic framework, developed by anti-materialists, which purports to show that metaphysical consequences do follow from conceivability. Second, he shows that there is nothing special about the concept of qualia compared with other concepts. Consequently he adopts 'non-ascriptivism', which negatively answers the following question: '[F]or most terms, do we have *a priori* access to sufficient information to determine their referent given a context . . . ?' (p. 53). He concludes, therefore, that '[f]rom the fact that the phenomenal facts are not derivable *a priori* from the physical facts it does not follow that the phenomenal facts are not realized by the physical facts' (p. 68).

After disarming the anti-materialist force of the conceivability argument Levine tries to establish (2)—the claim that phenomenal consciousness, raw feelings or qualia cannot be explained physicalistically—in chapter 3. He contends that 'there are good reasons for thinking that, unlike other macro domains, when it comes to qualia, we lack not merely enough detail to provide the requisite explanation, but any idea of how such a theory might go' (p. 69). In addition to the conceivability argument, Levine examines Frank Jackson's 'knowledge argument' as one of the major arguments that demonstrate the explanatory gap between physical properties and qualitative properties. Although Levine does not accept Jackson's anti-materialist conclusion, he does derive an epistemic conclusion from the knowledge argument: 'The fact that it seems so clear that . . . [Mary, the protagonist of Jackson's thought experiment,] would learn what it's like to experience red is testimony to the explanatory gap that separates physical theory and conscious experience' (p. 77).

I believe that Levine's response to the knowledge argument is subject to at least two kinds of objections. First, it is not as obvious as Levine assumes that Mary, who knows everything about the physical, would really learn something new upon her release. In fact there have been several attempts to reject this assumption (e.g. Paul M Churchland, 'Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States', *Journal of Philosophy* 82, 1985; Daniel C. Dennett, *Consciousness Explained* 1991). Second, there are a number of objections against Levine's way of undermining premises of the knowledge argument (e.g. David J. Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind* 1996; Daniel Stoljar, 'Physicalism and the Necessary A Posteriori' *Journal of Philosophy* 97, 2000). Levine says 'For the same reasons I do not accept the conceivability argument, I do not accept the knowledge argument' (p. 77), but the knowledge argument is obviously quite distinct from the conceivability argument.

If Levine's explanatory gap were merely apparent then there would be several possible ways for materialists to overcome the gap. They might be able to show that the gap is filled because phenomenal consciousness is to be reductively explained. Or they might be able to demonstrate that the gap is an illusion because phenomenal experience is to be eliminated from their ontology. In chapters 4 and 5 Levine tries to refute those attempts. As a consequence he is committed to the 'modest qualophile' which says that, although there are good reasons to hold materialism, 'no materialist theory seems to really explain our experience, to make intelligible how a system satisfying the materialist's description could be a subject of conscious experience' (p. 128). Finally in chapter 6 Levine closes his exploration of the puzzle of consciousness by analysing the 'replacement argument' and the 'zombie epistemology argument', both of which have arisen from the recent debate on consciousness and cognition.

One weakness that I find in the book is Levine's over-dependence on the conceivability argument. On the one hand I think that Levine's notion of the explanatory gap is extremely compelling and that it is at least very difficult for materialists to provide a fully acceptable solution that bridges the gap. But on the other hand I worry that readers might have a false impression that Levine's concept of the explanatory gap is almost solely derived from the highly controversial conceivability argument. For although Levine examines other challenges to materialism, his discussion of them is significantly briefer than that of the conceivability argument. I nevertheless recommend the book to anyone who is interested in the problem of consciousness. Though the recent popularity of consciousness studies has produced an increase in books on the topic, I find few more provocative and well-written than Levine's *Purple Haze*.

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Fisette, Denis (ed.), *Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution*, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999, pp. viii + 361, US\$140, £88 (cloth).

Consciousness and Intentionality is a collection of papers based on talks delivered at Montreal in 1995, at a conference with the same title. The collection is divided into four thematic sections: (1) consciousness, with an introduction by Pierre Poirier; (2) the problem of qualia, with an introduction by Luc Faucher; (3) the ascription of intentional states, with an introduction by Martin Montminy; and (4) externalism and mental causation, with an introduction by Paul Bernier. The four sections are loosely related to each other and even the papers within each section cover a wide variety of issues, as often happens when conference presentations are collected together. In spite of the heterogeneity of topics and philosophical stands represented, it is interesting to note that there are unifying features. For instance, the philosophers whose work is most often quoted across the collected papers, and considered as a starting point for discussion, are Donald Davidson for an account of intentional ascription and mental causation and Fred Dretske for a naturalized theory of representation. The reference to Davidson's and Dretske's writings allows us to identify a common background for some of the topics that receive attention here. More generally, the collection in its entirety can be seen as a contribution to the investigation of the limits and the virtues of naturalization projects, and a very useful reading for the philosopher of mind who wants to keep up with the recent debates.

As we are told in the Preface and in the Introduction to the first section, the necessity to deal with the topics of consciousness and intentionality comes from the attempt to dissolve an apparent tension. Most of the contributors embrace a naturalistic view of the mind, according to which mental states, events or properties are natural states, events or properties. While natural phenomena are supposed to be satisfactorily explained within the framework of a natural science, the phenomena of