

and criticizes the idea of a mental module for mate-selection. The volume closes with two essays about animal minds, which explore current research on animal consciousness and language acquisition.

The essays cover a diverse array of interconnected topics. Though each essay may be profitably read on its own, each is also nicely complemented by others in the volume. While the essays engage in a number of different arenas of debate, the most notable theme is perhaps the pluralist conception of classification, which is a useful corrective to the tendency to identify realism with commitment to uniqueness of classificatory scheme.

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Martin Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 291, AUS\$49.95.

Although many will be familiar with the six essays in *Off the Beaten Track* from earlier translations, it has taken over half a century for the contents of Heidegger's 1950 collection *Holzwege* to appear in English in a single volume. This is not a little surprising and all the more reason to welcome a translation that, in general, represents an advance in fidelity and readability over its predecessors.

As Heidegger's prefatory note explains, a '*Holzweg*' is a path in a wood that has arisen naturally and not by human intervention. To find oneself on a '*Holzweg*' can therefore be disconcerting: with Heidegger's approval the French translation was entitled '*Chemins qui ne mènent nulle part*' ('Paths that lead nowhere'). Nonetheless, the pessimism of a '*Holzweg*' corresponds to a questionable expectation of results and closures. Heidegger is not a pessimist. He is not E. M. Cioran. If his paths lead nowhere, it is because a path can only betray the matter of thought by disentangling itself for the sake of a result.

Each of the essays amounts to a contestation of the assumptions and practices—the beaten track—of two and a half millennia of Western history. 'The Origin of the Work of Art', the first text in the volume, is arguably the most significant contribution to the philosophy of art since Hegel's *Aesthetics*. 'The Age of the World Picture', a sustained critique of modern science, enunciates alongside 'Nietzsche's Word: "God is Dead"' Heidegger's analysis of nihilism. And in the course of a not uncritical study of the work of Rainer Maria Rilke, 'Why Poets?' contends that what poets are for must be understood in terms of the necessity of a confrontation with the essence of nihilism.

Off the Beaten Track also displays Heidegger's considerable gifts as a historian of philosophy. The longest of the six essays is a fascinatingly wily exegesis of the introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. As much as Adorno was infuriated by the intrusiveness of this reading of Hegel, Arendt was bewitched by the 1946 reading of Anaximander included in this volume, discerning in its reflections on contemporary events an openness without precedent or reprise in Heidegger's works.

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Kirk, Robert, *Mind and Body*, Chesham: Acumen, 2003, pp. vii + 200, US\$75.00 (cloth), US\$22.95 (paper).

This is a concise guidebook to the mind-body problem in Acumen's *Series of Central Problems of Philosophy*. Kirk's writing style is clear and systematic and the book is to be recommended to anyone interested in the mind-body problem.

Chapter 1 is an introduction to the conceptual foundations of the problem. Kirk contends that the problem is divided into three sub-problems: consciousness, intentionality, and the

relations between physical and psychological explanations. Chapter 2 concerns dualism. Kirk introduces various distinct forms of dualism, such as Cartesian interactionism, occasionalism, and epiphenomenalism. Chapter 3 concerns physicalism and covers such essential topics as Smart's identity theory, Kripke's discussion of psycho-physical identities, mental causation, eliminativism, supervenience, and so on. One of the most distinctive parts of this book is Chapter 4. Kirk spends the entire chapter on various recent arguments against physicalism; in particular, the knowledge argument and the conceivability argument. His discussion on the conceivability argument is especially thorough and interesting. (Kirk is renowned, by the way, for his 1974 paper, 'Zombies v. Materialists', which contains one of the earliest contemporary formulations of the conceivability argument.) It should be noted that since it is only in the last couple of years that the debate on the conceivability argument has attained maturity, there are few introductory books that cover issues on the argument as thoroughly as this one. Chapter 5 concerns behaviourism. It explains such important notions as disposition, intentionality, and the Turing machine. Chapter 6 concerns Functionalism. Kirk spends a large part of this chapter on several challenges to functionalism, such as absent qualia, transposed qualia, and the explanatory gap argument. Since similar issues are covered in Chapters 4 and Chapter 8 it might have been better if Kirk had instead discussed in detail various different forms of functionalism, such as analytical functionalism, computational functionalism, and so on. Chapter 7 provides a more detailed examination of intentionality. Fodor's language of thought hypothesis and connectionism are the main topics here. Chapter 8 provides a more extensive discussion of consciousness. Kirk considers various attempts to account for consciousness and concludes that there are serious difficulties with them. Other central topics in the philosophy of mind, such as mental content and externalism, are only very briefly introduced in Chapter 9, which represents the conclusion of the book.

Since this is not a comprehensive textbook, it does not cover all the important topics in the philosophy of mind. However, it does provide an excellent overview of the mind-body problem, one of the oldest and the most interesting problems in the field.

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Solomon, Robert C. and David Sherman, eds., *The Blackwell Guide to Continental Philosophy*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, pp. viii + 345, \$69.30 (cloth).

This is a solid collection of essays on all the best known figures of Continental Philosophy. All the contributions are clear, accessible and could be usefully recommended to undergraduates seeking to find their bearings in this area but a slightly disappointing air of conventionality and dullness limit the value of the volume beyond this range. In this as in other respects the *Guide* compares unfavourably with the Blackwell *Companion to Continental Philosophy* which ranges much more widely in scope and ambition as well as engaging more imaginatively in its introduction with the problem of how Continental Philosophy might be defined. There is an air of intellectual excitement in many of the contributions to the *Companion* which is largely lacking from the *Guide* and although the narrowness of focus of the latter allows for longer essays, on the whole my inclination would be to direct students looking for this kind of overview to the broader and livelier version.

That said, there are some good things to be found here. David Cooper's explication of Kierkegaard's philosophy is a finely compressed exegesis cogently rendering the complex relations between key philosophical and spiritual themes; Douglas Kellner gives us a Marx who continues to speak to our times and conditions of deep global inequality; Jeff Malpas makes good work of tracing the internal development of Heidegger's thought within and beyond the seminal *Being and Time*; and David Ingram's comparison of the work of Habermas and Gadamer provides one of the more substantive contributions of the book, simply by virtue of exploring the relationship of these thinkers. Overall, however, an air of